Tag: Scalability

Publications

Proceedings of Tokenomics 2020

Tokenomics is an international forum for theory, design, analysis, implementation and applications of blockchains and smart contracts. The goal of the conference is to bring together economists, computer science researchers and practitioners working on blockchains in a unique program featuring outstanding invited talks and academic presentations.

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Publication Tokens and Icos a Review of the Economic Literature | Blockchain@X
Publications

Tokens and Icos : a Review of the Economic Literature

Tokens and ICOs: A review of the Economic Literature, with Andrea Canidio, Vincent Danos and Stefania Marcassa, This article is a part of Principles of Blockchain Systems, Synthesis Lectures on Computer Science, 2021, Vol. 9, No. 2 About the book This book is the first to present the state of…

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Publication Reversible Composable Contracts | Blockchain@X
Publications

Reversible and Composable Financial Contracts

It is widely believed that financial markets cannot be liquid without centralised processes to manage counterparty risk. We propose an alternative method for liquidity based on reversible and composable contracts run atop a blockchain. Novel instruments for zero-collateral intermediation can be defined.

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Publication Proceedings Tokenomics 2019 | Blockchain@X
Publications

Proceedings of Tokenomics 2019

Tokenomics is an international forum for theory, design, analysis, implementation and applications of blockchains and smart contracts. The goal of the conference is to bring together economists, computer science researchers and practitioners working on blockchains in a unique program featuring outstanding invited talks and academic presentations.

Read More »
Publication an equilibrium of the market for bitcoin mining | Blockchain@X
Publications

An Equilibrium Model of the Market for Bitcoin mining

We propose a model which uses the exchange rate of Bitcoin against the US dollar to predict the computing power of Bitcoin network. We show that free entry places an upper-bound on mining revenues and we devise a structural framework to measure its value. Calibrating the model’s parameters allows us…

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Publication On Fairness in Committee‐Based Blockchains | Blockchains@X
Publications

On Fairness in Committee-based Blockchains

Committee-based blockchains are among the most popular alternatives of proof-of-work based blockchains, such as Bitcoin. They provide strong consistency (no fork) under classical assumptions, and avoid using energy-consuming mechanisms to add new blocks in the blockchain. For each block, these blockchains use a committee that executes Byzantine-fault tolerant distributed consensus…

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Publication On the Privacy of a Code‐Based Single Server Computional Pir Scheme | Blockchain@X
Publications

On the Privacy of a Code-based Single-server Computational Pir Scheme

We show that the single-server computational PIR protocol proposed by Holzbaur, Hol- lanti and Wachter-Zeh in [HHW20] is not private, in the sense that the server can recover in polynomial time the index of the desired file with very high probability. The attack relies on the following observation. Removing rows…

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Publication Rational vs Byzantine Players in Consensus Based-Blockchains | Blockchain@X
Publications

Rational vs Byzantine Players in consensus-based Blockchains

We analyze from the game theory point of view Byzantine Fault Tolerant blockchains when processes exhibit rational or Byzantine behavior. Our work is the first to model the Byzantine- consensus based blockchains as a committee coordination game. Our first contribution is to offer a game-theoretical methodology to analyse equilibrium interactions…

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